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NOTE
SMALL CAP COMPANIES AND THE DIAMOND IN
THE ROUGH THEORY: DISPELLING THE IPO
MYTH AND FOLLOWING THE REGULATION A
AND REVERSE MERGER EXAMPLES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Myth 11: The U.S. Is Losing Its Competitive Edge to Foreign Markets
If you were to open a copy of the Wall Street Journalon February
12, 2007, you would come across an article titled U.S. May be Losing Its
Appeal to Foreign Investors, Report Warns. Opening the same paper one
month later on March 12, 2007, your eyes might be drawn to the words
Panel Urges Steps to Boost Allure of U.S. Markets.2 The headlines in
early 2007 surrounding the American securities markets have primarily
focused on the notion that these markets are losing the competitive edge
they once held globally, specifically placing the European and Asian
markets at the top of the list of competitors. 3 But what is the basis for
this frenzy? The articles cite the decline in, or lack of, initial public
offerings ("IPOs") as one of the key indicators that the American
economy is not performing well amid stiff competition abroad.4 What is
not found in these articles is exactly when and why IPOs, few in number
and selectively carried out, became the final word on how our economy
is performing. If we had more companies that have enjoyed tremendous
success in IPOs, such as Starbucks entering the public market for the

1. The original myth format is attributed to Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed
Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631 (1972-73).
2. Greg Ip, U.S. May be Losing Its Appeal to Foreign Investors, Report Warns, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 12, 2007, availableat http://www.ofii.org/newsroom/news/022007wsjnew.htm; Kara Scannell,
Panel Urges Steps to Boost Allure of U.S. Markets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2007, at A l.
3. See, e.g., lp, supra note 2; Scannell, supra note 2, at Al, A8.
4. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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first time and earning tremendous returns on its IPO shares, would we
say our economy was performing well?
Myth 2: Securities Regulations Are the Sole Cause of the Decline in
America's Share of lPOs
Even if one were to concede that the American securities markets
are losing investors to the appeal of foreign markets, and that IPOs are a
reliable means of assessing this end, is it the American securities laws
that have forced the investor's hand abroad? The current debate centers
on whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and domestic overregulation are the driving forces behind the movement of many U.S.
investors overseas and many foreign investors away from the U.S.
markets. 5 Proponents of this position ask whether we need to ease up on
our securities laws, specifically whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
is too onerous.6 But could it be that there are other factors, such as the
rise in class actions resulting from alleged violations of Sections 11 and
12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 7 as amended (the "Securities Act") and
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,8 as amended (the
"Exchange Act"), which are the more immediate causes of this
downward trend? This last question, which should arise frequently in the
articles covering the competitive decline of the U.S. markets, has
become lost under what has ultimately become a blame-game, rooted in
the need for securities law reform. On the other end of the debate is the
argument that increased technology and markets abroad, combined with
the lax nature of the laws governing foreign markets, are the real
culprits. 9 However, if we look beyond the noise, does the blame really
fall where it should?
Myth 3: IPOs Are the Only (or Widely) Available Methods of
GoingPublic
There was a time "when the very phrase 'going public' conjured so
much in the entrepreneurial imagination," including a sense of fulfilling
the American Dream-of gaining the prestige of having a company's

5. See infra Part III.B.1.
6. See infra Part III.B.1.
7. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000); Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. §
77k (2000); Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2000).
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
9. See infra Part 11I.B.2.
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shares traded on a market in which all can participate.' 0 However, in
light of the rising and almost unattainable costs of IPO s ," and in recent
years the unwillingness of underwriters to complete IPOs for smaller
companies,1 2 small companies are exploring alternative methods of
gaining access to public markets. Among these alternatives is Regulation
A, a method which has been utilized for years, and reverse mergers,
which were popular in the 1980s, but fell into disuse after a series of
schemes rendered it a breeding ground for fraud. 13 However, with a
tightening of the laws surrounding the technique, the prospects of fraud
have become minimal and reverse mergers have again become a
promising vehicle to take small companies public.14 Perhaps the
American markets as a whole should follow the small business issuer
example. If these alternative methods of IPOs are being successfully
used to achieve public status, is it possible the American markets would
benefit by exploring an increase in their use?
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II discusses the entry of a
company into the public market through what is known as the
registration process. It explains how an IPO is conducted and the
balancing act a company must engage in when considering going public,
in light of its goals, constraints and opportunities. Part III explores the
current attention to the fear that America may be losing its competitive
edge to overseas markets as marked by the decline in American IPOs.
Part III attempts to capture and explore the alternate theories being cited
for the loss with a strong focus on the American securities laws. Part IV
questions the weight placed on IPOs as a true indicator of American
competitiveness and explores alternative explanations for declines in the
American securities markets. It also explores how widely used IPOs are
and the means of access to IPOs for smaller companies. Part v. contains
recommendations for improving American competitiveness through the
exploration of what I call the "diamond in the rough theory." The theory
evaluates the potential of following the lead of small business issuers in
using Regulation A and reverse mergers as viable and profitable means
10. Ian Mount, Death of the IPO Dream, FORTUNE SMALL Bus., Apr. I, 2005, at 16.
11. JAMES B. ARKEBAUER, GOING PUBLIC: EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW TO TAKE
YOUR COMPANY PUBLIC, INCLUDING INTERNET DIRECT PUBLIC OFFERINGS 33, 165 (1998) (Many

underwriters require that the company show it is generating sales of $10 to $20 million annually
with profits of $1 million and has a minimum of $4 million in tangible net assets to obtain a
NASDAQ listing.).
12. See Greg Ip, Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, In Call to Deregulate Business, a
Global Twist, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at Al.
13. See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
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of attaining public status. If America removes some of the reliance we
place on IPOs as a mark of the success of our markets, we may find
competitive gains in regulations and methods that are often overlooked.
By employing alternatives to IPOs, we may find that companies closed
off to public markets by the almost unattainable costs of the IPO process
to all but the most affluent of companies have the potential to be the next
Starbucks, Google, or Microsoft, generating new prospects for profits in
the American markets-if we can only remove these "diamonds" from
the "rough."
II.

GOING PUBLIC AND THE REGISTRATION PROCESS

A.

What Does It Mean to Be a Public Company?

A reporting company (commonly coined a public company) is one
that has issued securities that trade on at least one stock exchange or
over-the-counter market or has otherwise completed a public offering of
its securities.1 5 A company whose shares are publicly traded must meet
the periodic and other reporting requirements set forth in Sections 13
and 15(d) of the Exchange Act.16 To effect a public offering, commonly
termed "going public," a company must register the offered securities

under the Securities Act by filing a registration statement with the
Securities and 7Exchange Commission ("SEC") prior to making any
offers or sales.'
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2000).
These sections establish the periodic reporting obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
16. See supra note 15.
17. Walter E. Jospin & Elizabeth Hardy Noe, Securities Act Registration Process, in
UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 2001 at 53 (Practicing Law Institute 2001). "Generally,
most IPOs are filed on Form S-1 ." Id. at 64. The rules, regulations and instructions that provide for
the contents of the registration statement and prospectus are Regulation S-K, which contains
uniform disclosure items applicable to filings under the Securities and Exchange Act and Regulation
S-X, which governs financial statements in these filings. THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL: WHAT IS INVOLVED

IN A SECURITIES

OFFERING? 4 (1998) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL]. General Instruction I to Form S-1,
under Regulation S-K, provides that it shall be "used for registration under the Securities Act of
1933 of securities of all issuers for which no other form is authorized or prescribed, except that this
form shall not be used for securities of foreign governments or political subdivisions thereof." 17
C.F.R. § 239.11 (2006). Form S-3, under Regulation S-K, may be used to register securities when
certain qualifications are met, such as the registrant is organized under the laws of the U.S. and has
its principal business operations in the U.S. and has a class of securities registered pursuant to
Section 12(b) or 12(g) of the Exchange Act or is required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of
the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13. Form S-4, under Regulation S-K, may be used for
registration under the Securities Act of securities to be issued in a merger in which the applicable

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss4/9

4

Nahoum: Small Cap Companies and the Diamond in the Rough Theory: Dispelli
THE DIAMOND IN THE ROUGH THEORY

2007]

B.

The Registration Process-TheRoad to the Public Market

Any security to be offered or sold in the U.S. must be registered
under the Securities Act unless an exemption from registration applies to

the transaction or the security itself.18 To initiate registration, a company
must file a registration statement with the SEC. 19 The purpose of a
registration statement is to facilitate informed investment decisions and
discourage the fraudulent promotion of worthless securities.2 ° A
registration statement is generally composed of: (1) information that is
required to be included in a prospectus; and (2) additional information
not required to be disclosed in a prospectus. 21 The substance of the
registration statement is set by Section 7 of the Securities Act and a

range of SEC regulations. 22
Registration statements require in-depth explanations of the
industry in which the issuer operates, the services or products the
company provides, the risk factors associated with the issuer's industry
and operations, the intended use of the money received in the offering,
information about officers, directors and principal shareholders, and

audited financial statements for current and prior years.2 3 After the
registration statement is drafted, it must be filed with the SEC, at which
time it is subject to review by the SEC's Division of Corporation
Finance. 24 The SEC will provide the issuer with comments on the
state law would require the solicitation of the votes or consents of all the security holders of the
company being acquired, in an exchange offer for securities of the issuer to another entity, in a
public reoffering or resale of any such securities acquired pursuant to Form S-4, or in more than one
of the kinds of the transactions listed. 17 C.F.R. § 239.25. Form SB-I under Regulation S-B may be
used by a small business issuer to register up to $10,000,000 of securities to be sold for cash, if they
have not registered more than $10,000,000 in securities offerings in any continuous twelve month
period, including the transaction being registered. 17 C.F.R. § 239.9. Form SB-I may be used until
the company registers more than $10,000,000 in securities under the Securities Act in any
continuous 12 month period or when it no longer meets the definition of small business issuer in
Rule 405 of the Securities Act. Id. Form SB-2 under Regulation S-B may be used by a small
business issuer to register securities to be sold for cash. 17 C.F.R. § 239.10. Form 1-A, under
Regulation A, is used for securities offerings made pursuant to Regulation A for an aggregate
offering strictly limited to $5 million in securities which may be sold in any twelve month period.
17 C.F.R. § 239.90; DAVID N. FELDMAN, REVERSE MERGERS: TAKING A COMPANY PUBLIC
WITHOUT AN IPO 171 (2006).
18. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL, supra note 17, at 3.
19. Id.
20. JAMES D. CoX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 117 (5th ed. 2006).
21. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL, supra note 17, at 3.
22. Id.
23. COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 145-48.
24. For a further analysis of the registration process, including a detailed description of the
SEC review procedures, the restrictions on publicity and solicitations for offers prior to and
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registration statement and the issuer will file one or more amendments in
response to these comments with the SEC.25 When there are no further
comments the registration statement is considered to be effective, subject
to certain timing restrictions.26 The registration statement must be
declared effective before a public offering may be consummated.2 7
Once the registration statement has been declared effective by the
SEC, the company must comply with the reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act for an entire fiscal year under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the
Exchange Act. 28 Fulfilling these requirements subjects the company to
numerous additional costs, which are examined below, and include the
fees of attorneys and accountants, who, due to the complexity of the
29
process, are almost always necessary parties in the registration process.
So what exactly is the appeal of going public? The simple answer is
that going public can generate incredible wealth for a company if the
offering is successful. 30 But public companies enjoy other benefits as
following the effective date and prospectus delivery requirements see Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15
U.S.C. § 77e (2000); INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL, supranote 17, at 4-12.
25. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL, supranote 17, at 8.
26. Id. at 8 & n.8 ("As a technical matter, under Section 8(a) [of the Securities Act], a
registration statement becomes effective 20 days after filing, or in the event one or more
amendments are filed prior to the effective date, 20 days after the filing of the last such
amendment."). When the issuer is prepared to sell the securities they have registered in the
registration statement, and no further comments are offered by the SEC, or the SEC has declared
there will be no further review, the issuer and/or managing underwriters may request that the
effective date be accelerated pursuant to Rule 461. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.461 (2006).
27. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL, supra note 17, at 3.
28. Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2000).
Each issuer which has filed a registration statement containing an undertaking which is
or becomes operative under this subsection as in effect prior to August 20, 1964, and
each issuer which shall after such date file a registration statement which has become
effective pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, shall file with the
Commission, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors, such supplementary and periodic information, documents, and reports as may
be required pursuant to section 78m of this title in respect of a security registered
pursuant to section 781 of this title.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The duty to file under this subsection shall also be automatically
suspended as to any fiscal year, other than the fiscal year within which such registration statement
became effective, if, at the beginning of such fiscal year, the securities of each class to which the
registration statement relates are held of record by less than three hundred persons. Id.
29. See infra Part II.E.
30. To be sure, the prospects of wealth are far from speculative. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
BYRON, MARTHA INC.: THE INCREDIBLE STORY OF MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA 352

(2003) (discussing that Martha Stewart's IPO of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia in October
1999, which would have generated $614.7 million if it traded at the $18 it was originally priced at,
actually traded at $37.25 the day of the IPO, instantly bringing her individual net worth to $1.27
billion); see also JAMES J. CRAMER, CONFESSIONS OF A STREET ADDICT V. (2002) (describing the
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well. Public companies have an easier time attracting investors than
private companies because ownership interests in public companies are
easier to turn into cash or, in other words, are more liquid.3 1 Because of
this liquidity, public companies can use their stock to gain additional
financing and to attract experienced executives, by offering stock as part
of a compensation package, whose expertise may prove crucial in
meeting or even exceeding the company's goals for growth. Thus, for
suitable companies, a public offering can allow a company to grow and
expand in ways that private companies simply cannot.
C. The IPO-The TraditionalChoicefor Public Market Debut
The IPO is perhaps the most ubiquitous term in public offering talk.
An IPO is the first offering sale of a corporation's shares to public
investors.33 IPOs are initiated to assist the company in generating capital,
and often companies who engaged in IPOs list on public stock
exchanges.34 The term only applies to the first offering of an issuer's
shares, and any further offerings by the same issuers are called
secondary offerings.35 The registration process for an IPO is the same as
that described above.36
An IPO begins with the decision of a company to go public.
Management then searches for investment bankers to underwrite the
stock offering, which involves buying all the public shares at a
predetermined price and then reselling them to the public.37 The hope is
that the shares will be sought with great demand. The underwriters then
help the company prepare the prospectus and lawyers will typically help
draft the registration statement. 38 The proposed stock sale is then
publicized in the financial press in what are commonly termed
tombstone ads, due to their heavy print and black borders. 39 The
underwriters and management may also choose to engage in a "road
success of his IPO of TheStreet.com and how this "red-hot deal" would be "putting literally
hundreds of thousands of dollars into the pockets of whomever we gave it to").
31. ROBERT W. WALTER, COMPLETING A SMALL BUSINESS IPO 1-7 (2006).
32. Paul Rose, Balancing Public Market Benefits and Burdens for Smaller Companies Post
Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 707, 710-11 (2005).
33. Citi.com,
Selling New
Stock,
http://web.da-us.citibank.com/cgi-bin/citifi/scripts/
infrastructure/article.jsp?BVUseBVCookie=yes&BSId=LBP-9&M=S (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See supra Part l.B.
37. Citi.com, supra note 33.
38. Id.

39.

Id.
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show" by which the company travels to inform people about the
40
upcoming offering and gain interest for the shares. Any solicitations
for offers or sales of these shares however are prohibited until the SEC
declares the registration statement effective. 4 1 The day before the actual
sale, underwriters price the issue, which means they set the price they
will pay for each share.42 When the stock begins trading the next day, the
price can either rise or fall depending on demand and whether investors
agree with the price set by the underwriters.43
The IPO process can take upward of nine to twelve months
depending on the size and complexity of the offering.44 Ultimately,
determining whether a company is suitable for a public offering depends
on how the company's goals fit within the benefits and risks spectrum of
going public. It is important to note that due to the current costs of
public offerings and maintaining public status, going public using
traditional means may not even be an option worth considering for
smaller companies. 45 The following section provides an overview of the
benefits, costs and risks of going public, and being public.
D. The Benefits of Public Status
When we hear about companies going public, we are often focused
on the companies that enter the market with more success than ever
imagined, such as Martha Stewart, Google, and Starbucks.46 The
decision to go public, however, involves more time, money and
preparation than one would imagine. Thus, the decision cannot be made
lightly and the outcome can be the beginning of a bright future or can be
the end of a dream for the company endeavoring on this journey. The
benefits of achieving public status, however, are numerous and include:

40. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 602 (3d ed. 2001).
41. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL, supra note 17, at 3.
42. Citi.com, supra note 33.
43. Id.
44. FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 24.
45. Item 10 of Regulation S-B, defines small business issuer "as a company that meets all of
the following criteria: (i) has revenues of less than $25,000,000; (ii) Is a U.S. or Canadian issuer;
(iii) Is not an investment company and is not an asset-backed issuer (as defined in § 229.1101 of this
chapter); and (iv) if a majority owned subsidiary, the parent corporation is also a small business
issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 228.10 (2006).
46. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; Douglas MacMillan, Google's Historic IPO
Run: Beatable, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 16, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/aug2007/tc20070816_081016.htm?campaign_id=rss-tech; Steve James, Glare
7,
2003, available at
of Publicity Key in 1PO Success, REUTERS, Dec.
http://www.personal.psu.edu/txpl 4/pdfs/reuters%2012-7-03%20media.pdf.
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1. Increased Capital
A public offering can generate millions, and in some cases even
billions, of dollars in funding for a company.4 7 This funding can be used
to fulfill a number of a company's goals that can include consummating
a merger.48 Publicly traded stock is commonly used as consideration in
merger transactions, for advancing research opportunities, and
stimulating growth. 49 As a result of the increased value in their stock,
companies may choose to offer stock in lieu of cash when engaging in a
merger or acquisition as stock-for-stock acquisitions are generally
eligible to receive more favorable tax treatment than transactions
involving cash-for-stock. 50
2. Liquidity for Stockholders
Following the offering to the public, and after a short period of time
known as the "lock up period," executives and other employees can
begin to sell the stock they have accumulated (subject to any restrictions
under the securities laws such as Rule 10b-5, which governs insider
trading). 5' This liquidity benefit is much higher than that of private
issuers as there are more "outs," meaning the stock can be sold with
more ease. 52 The benefit is not temporary, but rather continues
throughout the life of the company as equity compensation will likely
continue to be paid to directors, executives and employees.53
Additionally, liquidity can provide leverage for a company seeking to
hire and/or retain talented employees and managerial staff as equity
compensation is often a common component of an executive
compensation package. 4
3. Enhanced Ability to Raise Equity
If a company's stock has performed well on the public market after
the company engages in a going public transaction, the company may
55
decide to undergo additional stock offerings to raise capital.
47. "in 2004, the average amount raised through an IPO was approximately $190 million,
with seven 1POs bringing in over a billion dollars each." Rose, supra note 32, at 712.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 712-13.
50. Id. at 713; 26 U.S.C. § 368 (2000) (Internal Revenue Code provision defining different
classes of reorganization by stock or otherwise).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2006); Rose, supra note 32, at 710-11 (the lock up period "is
generally set by contract between the shareholder and the issuer").
52. Rose, supranote 32, at 710.
53. Id. at 711.

54. Id.
55. Jospin & Noe, supra note 17, at 53.
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4. Less Dilution
In a public offering, a company can demand a higher price for its
56
stock than it would be able to in a private offering. Existing owners of
the company can give up less of their control, in the form of shares
owned, to receive the same amount of funding as they would in a private
offering.5 7
5. Company Prestige
A company that undergoes a public offering will become a part of
the public eye and will attract the attention of financial analysts. While
this may entail negative implications, it presents the company with an
opportunity to enhance its credibility and attract new shareholders.
[L]enders and suppliers may believe public companies to be better
credit risks, and thus may be inclined to offer better contract terms to
those companies. Because public companies are often deemed to be
more stable, potential customers may be more willing to contract with
or purchase goods and services from public companies than private
companies.
However, it is important to note that smaller companies often
receive less coverage and may not reap as many of the "publicity
benefits" that a larger company would.
Fame, publicity and profit are common only to very few of those
issuers who undergo the IPO process. 59 The rest either are not met with
the success that few IPOs have enjoyed or are dissuaded from the
process by the numerous costs and risks associated with the IPO process
and the subsequent maintenance a public company requires. The next
section outlines these costs and risks.

56. GEVURTZ, supranote 40, at 587.
57. Michael A. Woronoff & Jonathan A. Rosen, UnderstandingAnti-Dilution Provisions in
Convertible Securities, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 134-35 (2005) ("Dilution connotes a decrease in
something. As applied to equity securities, there are two potentially relevant dilution concepts:
percentage dilution, a decrease in the percentage of the entity an investor owns, and economic
dilution, a decrease in the economic value of the investor's investment in the entity."). Dilution
occurs through the issuance of new shares of a company or the issuance of securities convertible for
common stock of a company. Id.
58. Rose, supra note 32, at 713.
59. There were only seven well-publicized and highly profitable IPOs in 2006. See infra note
215 and accompanying text.
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E.

The Priceof Publicity

1. The Expense
An IPO is an extremely costly undertaking. Costs can vary
considerably depending upon an individual company's history, size and
complexity. At a minimum, legal costs can range anywhere from

$150,000 to $300,000, accounting fees anywhere from $20,000 to
$75,000 and audit fees from $30,000 to $200,000.60 Additionally,
printing fees can run between $20,000 and $60,000.61 Underwriter
commission and expenses usually vary between five percent and ten
percent of the proceeds of the offering and represent the bulk of the
62
expense. 62 Consequently, the total cost to take even a small company
public through an IPO can surpass $2 million.63 If the company plans to
trade its stock on a stock exchange or quotation system, its costs will
increase.
2. Costs of Remaining Public
Once a company completes a public offering, it must comply with
the federal securities law disclosure requirements. 65 The Exchange Act
requires public companies to file periodic reports with the SEC,
including the obligation to file quarterly Form 10-Q reports and annual
Form 10-K reports, to comply with complex rules relating to solicitation
of proxies under Section 14, to distribute an annual report to
stockholders and to publicly disclose any material developments, which
occur in the interim of 10-Q and 10-K filings, on a Form 8-K.66 All of
60. ARKEBAUER, supra note 11, at 31; COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 159. These numbers are
based on a 1995 estimate and thus do not account for increased prices over the past decade.
61. ARKEBAUER, supra note 11, at 32.
62. Jospin & Noe, supra note 17, at 54.
63. Wes Raffel, Is Going Public Worth the Cost?, VENTURE CAPITAL J., May 2005, at 49.
64. Application fees are usually required for the stock exchange or quotation system and
filing fees for the SEC, NASD, and possible fees for state securities administrators. See
ARKEBAUER, supra note 11, at 33; 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation-Federal§ 389 (1993)
(The NASD is a self-regulatory organization which "provides regulation of broker-dealers in a
manner generally similar to that imposed upon exchange members and associates by registered
national securities exchanges. The NASD provides for rules concerning the qualification and
examination of members and persons associated with members, establishing different qualifications
and examinations for various types of principals and registered representatives.").
65. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL, supranote 17, at 12.
66. Rose, supra note 32, at 714-15 (explaining events that prompt a Form 8-K filing
including: "significant acquisitions, the loss of key employees ... termination of the company's
relationship with a major customer"); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities
Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No.
24,559, [2000 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 86,319 at 83,697 (Aug. 15, 2000)
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these filing will require significant effort from the company's attorneys
and accountants, and the expense can range from an estimated $225,000
to $500,000 annually. 67 Company insiders and investors who hold large
amounts of the company's stock will be subject to the reporting
requirements of Section 16 of the Exchange Act and must file forms
with the SEC. 68 The issuer will also "incur costs
in creating and
69
managing an insider trading prevention program.,
3. Increased Exposure to Securities Law Actions
The officers, directors and major stockholders of a public company
could each face civil and/or criminal liability in the process of going
public and once they have gone public. Section 11 of the Securities Act
sets forth a private cause of action against the issuer by any person who
bought securities covered under the registration statement.7 ° Section
11 (a) provides that an issuer and any party who signed or assisted in
preparing a registration statement on its behalf may be held accountable
for any material misstatements or the omission of any material
information in the registration statement. 7' Section 12(1) establishes a
cause of action against an issuer for securities sold in violation of
Section 5 of the Securities Act, or in other words, has sold securities that
were not registered.72 Section 12(2) establishes a cause of action against
an issuer who has sold a security by prospectus or other communication
and such communication contains material misstatements or omissions.7 3
These sections are extremely user-friendly as they are intent irrelevant
and reliance does not need to be demonstrated in most cases. 74 Rule 1Ob5 of the Exchange Act prohibits "trading by the company, its insiders or
(estimating that on average issuers will make five filings per year under Regulation FD; one
disclosure per quarter plus one additional disclosure per year).

67. GEVURTZ, supra note 40, at 604.
68. See Exchange Act Rule 16a-3, 17 C.F.R. 240.16a-3; Cox ET AL., supra note 20, at 920
(stating Section 16(a) "is a reporting obligation, imposed on officers, directors, and 10 percent
shareholders, to file with the SEC forms that indicate holdings in the issuer's stock upon achieving
insider status." The form that must be filed with the SEC is a Form 3. "Thereafter, most purchases
or sales by the insider have to be reported by the end of the second business day following the
transaction on Form 4.... This 'real time' reporting of insider transactions is a product of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, stemming from concern that many insiders bailed out of company
stock in advance of discovery that the company had not been honest in its financial reporting,
without the public being aware of these trades until much later.").
69. Rose, supranote 32, at 714-15.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
71. Id.; INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL, supra note 17, at 13-14.
72. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL, supra note 17, at 15; 15 U.S.C. § 771.
73. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEAL, supra note 17, at 14.
74. COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 482, 485, 520.
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their 'tippees' in the company's stock during a time when all material
information regarding the company is not available to the public., 7' An
issuer may also expose itself to liability if its stock is sold short by
insiders or by failing to comply with the Securities laws, including
mandatory periodic filings.76
4. Pressure to Maintain Growth Pattern
Once a company is public, it is subject to considerable external
pressure that often manifests itself as demands on "management to
maintain or exceed financial expectations" and predictions.7 7 Companies
that cannot continue the predicted or expected patterns of growth may
lose the talent of employees and executives who were attracted to the
growth potential of the company going public and' 78may "decide to cash
out entirely as soon as possible following the IPO.

5. Takeover Exposure and Loss of Control
If a majority of the shares of a company are held by the public, the
company is at risk of being controlled by these outside owners. This is
especially true for publicly held entities where control can be further
diluted by subsequent public offerings and acquisitions, and existing
owners can be displaced by public ownership.79
6. Decreased Flexibility
Because going public inevitably includes an increase in the amount
of stockholders of the company's shares and may often include more
formalized board procedures and additional directors, the decision
making process becomes increasingly more complex and time
consuming. 80 The company will likely lose its ability to act quickly
when making important decisions such as mergers and further issuances
of stock, as shareholder and board approval may be required.8'
7. Dependence on Market Conditions
The IPO market is cyclical in nature as it experiences upturns and
downturns based on numbers of investors, public confidence, the

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Jospin & Noe, supra note 17, at 54.
Id.
Id.at 55.
Rose, supra note 32, at 711.
Jospin & Noe, supra note 17, at 55.

80. Id.
81.

Id.
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economy and many other factors. As a result, market conditions play a
significant role in evaluating the body of investors who will be receptive
to the public offering and in assessing the timing and price of the
company's offering.83 When a company decides to engage in an IPO,
strategic entry into the market is vital to the success of even the strongest
public offering.8 4 The implications of this for smaller companies are
even more severe. Since smaller companies tend to have fewer shares
available on the market, a shareholder may have difficulty finding a
thus find a "wider bidbuyer. The shareholder of a smaller company ' will
85
ask spread, resulting in less-efficient pricing.
8. Management Focus
The public offering process utilizes a significant amount of
management's time, commonly termed distraction costs. 86 "[D]uring the
registration, some 75 percent of the CFO's time, about 40 percent of the
CEO's time, and 20 percent of other senior officers' time will be
devoted to matters related to the offering. 87 If the company engages in a
"road show," a common practice in IPOs by which officers travel to
various cities and try to entice potential investors to buy their stock, the
time management spends devoting to the going public process will
increase, and oversight of the core business by management will usually
be negatively affected. 88 Further, post-IPO management distraction is
inevitable as they are much more answerable to shareholders in public
companies as financial results are publicly known and changes in

82. COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 138; Jospin & Noe, supra note 17, at 56.
83. Jospin & Noe, supra note 17, at 56.
84. Id.
85. Rose, supra note 32, at 712; see Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask
Spread:A CriticalEvaluation ofAdverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 88-89
& n.26 (2004) (noting the bid-ask spread is the difference between the market makers "sell" and

"buy" prices respectively).
There are three basic measures of the bid-ask spread. First, the quoted spread is the
difference between the bid and ask prices quoted simultaneously. Second, the effective

spread is the difference between the actual bid and ask prices executed at the same time,
as many transactions occur inside the quoted spread. Finally, the realized spread is the

difference between the actual bid and ask prices for trades separated by a specified
period of time, which represents a profit or loss of a liquidity provider in the course of
transacting at the initial and subsequent prices.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
86.
87.
88.

COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 159.
See id.
Jospin & Noe, supra note 17, at 57.
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performance often need to be explained. 89 These costs and risks often
serve as a deterrent for issuers seeking to take their company public.
The first question a company must answer when determining
whether to go public is if the benefits and risks inherent to IPOs are
consistent with the company's goals, financial position, time constraints
and available personnel. The previous paragraphs outline only an
estimate of the costs of undertaking an IPO and the pricing will differ
depending on the size of the company, the offering and the fees charged
by the major players involved in the process: the underwriters, lawyers
and accountants. The decision must be made with an eye on reality
rather than potential glory as the IPO method benefits only few
companies who decide to use it as a means to attain the public status and
increase capital. Despite the fact that they are few in number, the number
of IPOs are regarded as a pervasive tool for evaluating the affluence of
the American economy.
III.

THE DEBATE OVER THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S. MARKETS ON A
GLOBAL SCALE

A.

The Decline of IPOs in American Markets

There has been much "hand-wringing" over the current condition of
America's capital markets and their growth ability both domestically and
internationally. 90 The recent concerns are based on observations that
foreign competitors have been absorbing a larger portion of the "public
market pie" than in past years, despite America's reputation as one of
the leading financial centers in the world. 9' The reasons for the
downward trend in foreign investments in the U.S. and the increase in
American investments abroad remain a subject of discussion, but the
focus of the blame seems to be the American regulatory process. 9'
Specifically, it has been noted by advocates of the U.S. economic
decline theory that IPOs are a crucial indicator of the well-being of the
American economy and so it follows that the decline in the market for

89. David Feldman, Reverse Mergers + PIPES: The New Small-Cap IPO, in PIPES: A GUIDE
TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY 251 (Steven Dresner ed.,
90. Down on the Street, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2006, at 69.

2005).

91. See id. at 69; Ip, supra note 2.
92. See Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 69-70; James Surowiecki, The FinancialPage
Over There, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 5, 2007, at 29.
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IPOs in the U.S. means our economy is not performing well. 93 As further
evidence of this theory, supporters warn that the American IPO market
has experienced declines not only domestically but internationally as
well.94 The argument posits that companies that were once praying for
entrance to America's exchanges in hopes of generating the most
promising of revenues are now turning to markets that are closer to
home to go public. 95 This decline, it is advanced, becomes magnified
when the number of American firms being taken out of public ownership
by private-equity firms is factored into the equation.9 6
The White House has reported in the Economic Report of the
President released in February 2007 that there are troubling indications
that the "U.S. may be losing its traditional appeal as a [lead] destination
for foreign investment., 97 Additionally, in January 2007, New York
Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Senator Charles Schumer released a
study arguing that "New York City's financial dominance was being
eroded, thus putting tens of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of
jobs at risk., 98 The Bloomberg and Schumer report also warned that five
years ago the NYSE dwarfed the London and Hong Kong exchanges in
terms of value of IPOs of stock; in 2006, it has been beaten by both. 99
Further, the Committee. on Capital Markets Regulation ("CCMR"), a
group of bankers, academics and investors formed in 2006 and headed
by Hal Scott, a Harvard Law School professor, released an interim report
on November 30, 2006 after researching a range of issues related to
maintaining and improving the competitiveness of the U.S. capital
markets.' 00 The Committee warns that the global competitive position of
the U.S. markets is waning dramatically, citing that only five percent of
93. See Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70 (coarsely describing that "[tlhe loudest
sucking sound has been in the market for initial public offerings, a crucial barometer of financial
wellbeing").
94. See Ip et al., supra note 12, at A17; Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70; Surowiecki,
supra note 92, at 29.
95. Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70; Surowiecki, supra note 92, at 29.
96. Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70.
97. Ip, supra note 2; ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 181 (Feb. 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/2007-erp.pdf.
98. Surowiecki, supra note 92, at 29.
99. See Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70; Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon,
Business Wins Its Battle to Ease a Costly Sarbanes-Oxley Rule, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2006, at Al
(citing evidence, in further support of this point, that of the top twenty IPOs in 2006, only three
occurred in the U.S., while in 2002, nine of the top twenty IPOs took place in the U.S.).
100.

See Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 69; COMM. ON CAPITAL

MARKETS

vii (Nov.
30, 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf
REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION

[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT].
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the value of global initial public offerings was raised in the U.S. last
year, compared to fifty percent in 2000.'0' Not surprisingly, the Interim
Report also proclaims regulatory burden and Section 404 of SarbanesOxley as heavy factors behind the so-called decline. 102 Likewise, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce established an independent, bipartisan
Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the TwentyFirst Century, whose findings were released on March 13, 2007,
evaluating the competitive position of American capital markets and
making recommendations to revive the American market as a global
leader. 10 3 These reports have become the focus of the current debate of
the state of America's competitiveness and have sparked an outcry of
blame.
The underpinnings of the debate focus on the decline in America's
shares of IPOs. What the Schumer and Bloomberg report "calls 'the
most dramatic illustration' of this slide toward disaster is a statistic that
may seem rather esoteric: in recent years, the number of foreign
companies choosing to go public in New York has plummeted, with
Europe and Asia snapping up much of the business." 10 4 Champions of
the theory that the U.S. is losing its competitive edge advance similar
statistics. First, that America's share of "global IPOs" is now only a
third of what it was in 2001, and in 2005 twenty-four of the twenty-five
largest global IPOs were held outside the U.S., a number which has
greatly added to concerns. 0 5 Second, that America's share of IPO
proceeds has also collapsed since the later 1990s. In 1999, "the peak of
the U.S. IPO boom," the NYSE and NASDAQ secured fifty-seven
percent of global IPO proceeds, which marked a significant increase
from the thirty-nine percent of proceeds America realized in 1990, and
by last year America's share plummeted to eighteen percent.'0 6 And
third, it is claimed that the global market is reaping these benefits. Hong
Kong, it is alleged, enjoyed the biggest increase, "snag[ing] 16% of
world IPO proceeds in 2006 compared with zero in 1990. ' 07 And the
101.

INTERIM REPORT, supra note 100, at x, 2.
102. Id. at 5. The Interim Report is also unique in that it cites the rise of class action "litigation
[as] a factor to be seriously considered" when discussing the decline in the economic position of the

United States on a global scale. Id.
103.
MARKETS

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2007), available at

http://www.uschamber.con/publications/reports/O703capmarketscomm.htm [hereinafter CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE REPORT].

104. See Surowiecki, supra note 92, at 29.
105.

See id.

106. lp et al., supra note 12.
107. Id.
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studies echo these conclusions. According to the Chamber of Commerce
Report, the fact that foreign companies engaging in IPOs have chosen to
list in countries such as the United Kingdom and not the United States is
grounds for concern.10 8
In addition to hearing warning bells that the U.S. market for IPOs is
dwindling, those who fear an IPO exodus point out that since 1996, there
has been a steady decline in the number of companies listing on U.S.
exchanges. 0 9 The U.S. market share for worldwide listings, they
emphasize, has dropped nineteen percent since 1997 while foreign
exchanges have enjoyed an increase in their listings during this period." 0
Indeed, the data does hint at Europe and Asia enjoying increased listing
as investors and companies stray from U.S. markets and exchanges."'I
Contributing to this alleged trend is the fact that U.S. investors, who
"bought a record of $21.2 billion of foreign stocks in [November 2006]"
alone, 1 2 are less demanding that foreign companies list in the U.S.
before they purchase shares." 13 For example, Mitchells & Butlers PLC, a
British operator of taverns, delisted from the NYSE in 2005.114 The
company cited low volume of trading (less than one percent of the total)
as not meriting the annual $1 million cost of periodic filing requirements
and auditor fees flowing from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002." 5 Mr.
Mills, indirect owner of about $10 million in Mitchells & Butlers shares,
believed that the stock was easier to trade at home6 and that all evidence
of American markets improving was speculative."
108. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 103, at 19.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. James J. Cramer, The Bush-Proof Portfolio, NEW YORK, available at
http://nymag.com/news/businessfinance/bottomline/27337/index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
113. Ipetal.,supranote 12.
114. See id.
115. See id. (noting that Mitchells & Butlers investors "want to go where the liquidity is").
116. See id.; see also Aaron Pressman, IPOs Are Looking Tasty Again, BUSINESS WEEK
ONLINE, Dec. 25, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_52/b4015047.htm.
The once-moribund market for initial public offerings heated up in 2006, giving savvy
investors an opportunity to beat the market by a wide margin. IPOs gained 24% through
Dec. 8, vs. a 13% gain for the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, according to
Renaissance Capital in Greenwich, Conn., as the amount of money raised jumped 19%,
to $38 billion.... The slow but steady return of technology IPOs is expected to
continue. Tech and telecom stocks generally did well in 2006, helping push open the IPO
window, says Dan Genter, president of RNC Genter Capital Management in Los
Angeles. The S&P 500's tech index gained almost 25% from mid-July through Dec.
8.... A few companies that have filed to go public in early 2007 look promising.
Francis Gaskins, editor of IPODdesktop.com, likes Supermicro Computers Inc., a
computer-server maker that has been profitable for 17 straight years and boasts solid
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B.

Theories of Decline: Regulatory Costs, Privatizationand
Improvements in Foreign Markets

1. Regulatory Costs
The regulatory system in America has received much of the blame
for the decline in American competitiveness. Specifically, the 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which toughened up corporate regulation following
the Enron and WorldCom scandals, has been touted as being
implemented and interpreted in ways that create new risks to our

economy and have forced companies to spend more on accountants than
17
research.'
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has itself been cited as one
of the fundamental sources of America's declining competitiveness.' 1 8
Section 404, often classified as one of the most contentious parts of the
act, requires an annual internal control report which must be certified by
auditors and must be personally signed off by two executives of a
company. 19 Section 404 has alleviated some of the concerns associated

growth. Time Warner Inc. (TWX) is expected to spin off its cable unit, but Gaskins says
he'll wait to see how the unit is valued relative to the roughly $3,000 per subscriber
figure for rivals.
Id.
117. Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70; Surowiecki, supra note 92, at 29 (arguing "that
overzealous regulation-as epitomized by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the anti-fraud law passed after
the Enron and WorldCom scandals-is making the U.S. an increasingly unalluring place to do
business"); Michael Schroeder, SEC Orders New Disclosures on Company Earnings, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 16, 2003, at A2 ("Responding to recent corporate scandals... federal securities regulators
ordered new disclosure rules to clamp down on an accounting practice that companies have
increasingly used to paint rosy financial results .... The changes were ordered by Congress under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a sweeping corporate accounting-overhaul law .... ").
118. See Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70. But see Christopher Cox, Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Remarks to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's First Annual
Capital Markets Summit: Securing America's Competitiveness (Mar. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch031407cc.htm
[hereinafter
Securing
America's
Competitiveness].
[I]t is wrong to conflate the implementation problems of 404 with the entirety of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. While it's a handy whipping boy, overall the law has had important
positive effects. It may fairly be credited with correcting the most serious problems that
beset our markets just a few years ago. It has played a significant and valuable role in
restoring integrity to our markets. Remember where we were, and what happened. We
needed decisive action. Sarbanes-Oxley delivered.
Id.
119. See Securing America's Competitiveness, supra note 118; Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15
U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2004).
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view seems to
with the Enron and WorldCom debacles, but the majority
1 20
zealously."
too
implemented
be the regulation "is being
After Sarbanes-Oxley was introduced, auditing expenses ballooned
and while they have since fallen some, for a large firm, accounting fees
21
can still top several million dollars a year. Audit fees for Standard &
Poor's 500 ("S&P 500") companies rose sixty-three percent to $4 billion
in 2004 from $2.5 billion in 2002, the same year Sarbanes-Oxley was
enacted.1 22 Companies on average spent $3.8 million each in fiscal year
2005 to conform with Section 404.123 Small and large issuers alike "have
complained that the way Section 404 is interpreted is overly broad and
requires them to spend many hours and millions of dollars documenting
things which124have nothing to do with the integrity of their financial
'

statements."

The Chamber of Commerce report noted that its goal was not to
restate the arguments that were being explored by the SEC that
Sarbanes-Oxley was one of the forces behind the decrease in U.S.
competitiveness, but devoted a few pages to the discussion of the
implications of the rule.12 5 The report distinguished between the direct
costs of Sarbanes-Oxley, specifically the implementation and
maintenance costs associated with Section 404, and the indirect costs,
which include the promotion of adversarial relationships between issuers
and their auditors and the marketing benefits foreign market centers have
been able to derive from Sarbanes-Oxley.126 It was found that foreign
markets have, with some success, benefitted from broadcasting the

120. Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70.
121. See id.
122. Scannell & Solomon, supra note 99, at Al; Irene Leech, Investingfor Your Future Unit 4:
Ownership Investments, available at http://www.investing.rutgers.edu/unit04.htmI (last visited Oct.
17, 2007) (Standard & Poor's 500 is an index used "to assess the general activity of the stock
market ...[it] includes 400 industrial companies, 40 financial institutions, 40 public utilities, and
").
20 transportation firms ....
123. Scannell & Solomon, supra note 99.
124. Id. (further noting that "[s]ome companies say auditors are interpreting the [SarbanesOxley] rules so literally that they are asking management to account for such things as who has
access to an office key").
125. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 103, at 32-34.
Further, although beyond the scope of this Commission's work, the Commission
believes that nationalistic and noneconomic factors also play a meaningful role. For
example, IPOs of Chinese state-owned enterprises may prefer to be centered in the Hong
Kong markets. Even if these Chinese entities are listing in regional markets, the fact that
they are not listing in the United States deprives American investors of opportunity.
Id. at 17.
126. Id. at 33.
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actual costs and burdens imposed on American reporting companies. 127
It was also reported that foreign markets have touted the speed with
which Sarbanes-Oxley was adopted as a "knee-jerk reaction to two wellpublicized bankruptcies"' 128 and implied that such responses arouse
29
questions about the American regulatory response to future problems. 1
The report stated that the SEC has announced that reviews of Section
404 of Sarbanes-Oxley are in place and have strongly hinted that the
burden of this regulation will be eased, especially for smaller firms.13 °
The report deferred to the SEC in making recommendations about
Sarbanes-Oxley, but emphasized a refining of the rules "to ensure the
' 31
best practical balance of costs and benefits.'
The notion that IPOs are declining, however, is a matter of
perception. Despite the headlining of figures that America's IPO share is
down compared to the global market, a recent report by Thomson
Financial evidences the virility of the U.S. IPO market. 32 The study
found that "foreign IPOs accounted for 16% of the 208 IPOs in the U.S.
last year," undoubtedly the highest in their twenty year review. 33 In
addition, foreign IPOs taking place in the U.S. in 2006 raised $10.6
billion of the $45.3 billion in IPO offerings priced domestically,
representing twenty-three percent of IPO money raised that year, which
is the highest percentage since 1994.134 Thomson Financial also reported
there were more foreign IPOs held by the U.S. in 2006 "than at any time
135
in the past 20 years, which hardly signals a regulation-induced flight.'

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70.
131. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 103, at 34. Among the principal
recommendations listed in the report are: to "modernize the federal government's regulatory

approach to financial markets," to "[c]onvince public companies to stop issuing earnings guidance,
to "[c]all on ... policy-makers to address the serious challenges facing the public company audit
profession," to give the SEC the flexibility to address issues relating to the implementation of
Sarbanes-Oxley by making Sarbanes-Oxley part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to

"[flacilitate the ability of employers.

..

to offer retirement savings plans," and to "[e]ncourage

employers to sponsor retirement plans through ... a simpler, consolidated 401(k)-type program."
Id. at 146.
132. Roel C. Campos, Commissioner, SEC, Speech in London, England on SEC Regulation
Outside the U.S. (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/
spch030807rcc.htm.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Kit R. Roane, Is Wall Street Losing Its Luster?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 12,
2007, at 40, availableat http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/070304/12wall_2.htm.
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Furthermore, IPOs are being assigned an unjustifiable weight in
analyzing the competitive state of the U.S. markets. Joseph P. Borg, the
President of the North American Securities Administrators Association,
has refuted the "recent reports suggesting that U.S. capital markets are
losing their competitiveness due to increased regulation" and has
reaffirmed the role of investor protection that is the "cornerstone" of
America's securities laws. 136 Specifically, he notes that the Committee
on Capital Markets Regulation and the Commission on the Regulation of
U.S. Capital Markets in the Twenty First Century are short-sighted and
"use an appeal to fear that the sky is falling in an attempt to obstruct" the
regulation that promises investor and market confidence and
protection. 137 As far as the appeals to fear that the U.S. is losing its
competitive position, Borg points to the fact that Wall Street experienced
record profits in 2006 and thus far in 2007 as evidence that the U.S.
138
This view
economy is not losing ground in the global marketplace.
and
Industry
Securities
the
that
fact
the
by
strengthened
becomes
industry's
securities
the
that
Financial Markets Association reported
2006 pretax profits nearly doubled what they were in 2005 and hit their
highest level ever. 139 The trade group reported the 2006 pretax net
income for the industry rose from $17.1 billion in 2005 to $33.1 billion,
an eighty-eight percent increase. 140 In light of the above data, it becomes
clear that the conclusions of the reports that allege the U.S. is losing its
competitive position need to be viewed with a skeptical eye. The reports
should be reevaluated to portray a more realistic picture of the global
state of American markets, one that does not place an undue reliance on
the number of IPOs in the U.S.

136. Press Release, North American Securities Administration Association, NASAA
Challenges Reports That 'Over-Regulation' Has Harmed U.S. Capital Market Competitiveness
(Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://www.nasaa.org/NASAANewsroom/Current_NASAA_
Headlines/6408.cfm.
137. Id.
138. Joseph Borg, President, North American Securities Administrators Ass'n, Speech at the
NASAA Symposium: Protecting Investors and the Integrity of Financial Markets (Mar. 22, 2007),
available at http://www.nasaa.org/NASAANewsroom/Speeches/6405.cfm# (noting that "Wall
Street has a large overseas stake in those foreign markets as well").
139. David Enrich, Securities Industry 2006 Pretax Profit $33. IB, Up 88 Percent,Dow JONES
NEWSWIRE, Apr. 2, 2007, available at http://www.easybourse.com/Website/dynamic/
(additionally stating that
News.php?NewslD=172759&lang=fra&NewsRubrique=2&pageliste=3
"[t]he huge 2006 profits were propelled in part by Wall Street firms' trading arms, which posted $43
billion in revenue, up 85 percent from $23.3 billion in 2005, according to SIFMA. Underwriting
revenue rose 18 percent to $23.6 billion from $20 billion a year earlier.").
140. Id.
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The alleged wounds that American securities regulations have been
inflicting on the U.S. markets not only have been claimed to be
impacting U.S. public markets globally, but domestically as well. The
cost and intrusiveness of American regulations, it is thus advanced, are
to be blamed for the shift of investments from the U.S. to overseas
markets, the decline in IPO numbers and the movement, or remaining of,
many companies in the private sphere. Overzealous American
regulations have additionally been cited as the driving force behind the
growing number of private equity backed companies being sold
14

privately. 1

The costs and regulatory hurdles to go public in the U.S. today are
driving venture-backed companies away from our capital markets
system.... It's easier for private-equity firms to recoup their entire
investment by selling to another private-equity firm, rather than the
2
small portion they typically sell in an IPO. 14
More of corporate America has been taken out of public ownership
by private-equity firms in the first ten months of 2006 than the previous
five years combined, spending a total of $178 billion. 143 In other words,
what is being furthered as an explanation for the decline in IPOs is that
foreign companies, who are wary of America's arduous regulations, are
shunning America. This is said to signal a grim future, in which foreign
firms stray from investing in the U.S. and, eventually, American
companies potentially abandon the American exchanges to list their
shares elsewhere. 144 However, the buying of public companies by the
private sector "is not merely a U.S. trend but a global one" as well. 145
Between 1996 and 2002, private-equity buyouts comprised two percent
of all domestic mergers and acquisitions and three percent of all such

141.

Seelpetal.,supranote 12, at Al7.

142.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

143. See Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70. But cf Dennis K. Berman & Henny Sender,
Big Buyout Firm Preparesto Sell Stake to Public, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2007, at A l (analyzing the
advanced stages of the IPO undertaking by Blackstone Group, a "lucrative partnership that has
grown rich taking public companies private" and noting that the offering of roughly 10% of its

management company would conservatively value the entire enterprise at $40 billion). Blackstone
and several of its rival companies have been said to be exploring IPOs "in the wake of the
successful stock-market listing of hedge fund Fortress Group in January." Id. at A l, A4.
144. Surowiecki, supranote 92, at 29.
145. Ip et al., supra note 12, at A17. But cf Michael Wolff, Serious Money, VANITY FAIR, May
2007, at 108 (noting that "private equity is now going public" and that the private equity "bubble"
has dangerously expanded leaving the question of whether the private equity mass-movement will

survive).
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increased to
global transactions. Between 2002 and 2006, the percentage
146
globally.
percent
ten
and
U.S.
eleven percent in the
2. The Foreign Markets Fast-Track
The growth of foreign markets and the increased appeal of these
markets as suitable and profitable targets of investments have been only
a minor focus with regard to the decline in American competitiveness. It
is often offered in conjunction with the theory that Sarbanes-Oxley is too
demanding and needs to be scaled back in order to save America's
competitive face. The argument advanced by Treasury Secretary Henry
M. Paulson, Jr. is that as U.S.-listed companies are adapting to SarbanesOxley, new listing rules for public companies, and regulatory and
enforcement action, global capital markets are evolving, developing and
147
Advances in
becoming major competitors for U.S. markets.
technology, regulation and capital abroad, have made foreign markets
increasingly more suitable mediums for investing. The lower costs of
trading in Foreign countries have allowed them to develop "vibrant local
4 8 As a result, it is
securities markets.., in multiple financial centers.'
advocated, the U.S. has experienced a steady decline in its share of
global capital markets and new challenges to the historical dominance
the U.S. enjoyed in the global marketplace have emerged.
The Chamber of Commerce report notes that the last two decades
have been marked by a globalization of securities markets, with
corporations, accounting firms, investment bank firms, law firms and
stock exchanges being internationalized. 49 With globalization comes
what I like to call the "twenty-four-hour desk" by which trading in the
U.S., Hong Kong and London can ensure twenty-four-hour coverage of
the markets. 50 Globalization has increased competition and many
foreign exchanges, like the one in Hong Kong, are now more liquid than
before, but also have much tougher regulations, ironically modeled on
those of the U.S. The Chamber of Commerce warned that the U.S.
"lacks an overall vision for how its legal and regulatory framework
should respond to these new [international] market developments.''

146.

lpetal.,supranote 12, atAl7.

147. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., United States Treasury Secretary, Opening Remarks at Treasury's
Capital Markets Competitiveness Conference at Georgetown University (Mar. 13, 2007), available
6
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp30 .htm.
148. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 103, at 11.
149. Id. at 2.
150. Ipetal.,supranote 12, atAl7.
151. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 103, at 11.
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However, globalization of U.S. markets is by no means a new
phenomenon. "[G]lobalization of the markets far precedes America's
regulatory reforms," which were enacted after the Enron scandals.152 A
report by Goldman Sachs showed that America's share of the world
equity market capitalization has been declining since the 1970s, a time
which predated many of the regulations being blamed for the so-called
current decline in American competitiveness.153 Additionally, the report
noted that America has never dominated the market as a global foreign
' 54
exchange and rather "[t]hat crown belongs to London.'
While globalization may be enhancing foreign markets, it is
important to note that it is possible that a number of the firms listing
overseas are "dodgy" companies that could serve to harm rather than
help the American markets.155 It is said that with global markets rapidly
changing, if the U.S. were to succumb to attacks on regulations such as
Sarbanes-Oxley without further inquiry into the true economic position
of our markets, it would be to show the world that America is giving a
green light to regulatory reform and is in essence inviting foreign
companies "to take advantage of the regulatory void."' 156 Thus,
globalization of the markets may not mean that the U.S. position as a
leader in capital markets is declining, but rather globalization may mean
more secure markets around the world, a notion consistent with the
57
purpose behind the securities laws. 1
C. The Scope of the IPO and Small Business Issuers
The cost of IPOs often serves as a barrier to going public for
smaller companies who cannot afford to expend the money on
58
underwriters, accountants and other key players in the process.
London and Hong Kong have proven less costly than America in going
public transactions as investment banks charge half the commission to
bring a company public than they do in the U.S. 159 This commission

comprises a significant amount of money for when the going public

152.
153.
154.
155.
overseas
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Roane, supra note 135, at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40 (noting that "[t]here are an awful lot of dodgy companies that are being floated
that would never been allowed over here... [a]nd that is a good thing").
Id.at4l.
Id.
See supra Part l.E.
See Surowiecki, supra note 92, at 29.
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fees represent
transaction is considered as a whole, investment bank
1 60
process.
the
during
outlays
cost
most of the company's
Because many of these fees and the costs of compliance associated
with Sarbanes-Oxley are fixed, big companies can incur them with
greater ease. 161 As a result, some small firms have turned to listing on
the London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market
("London's AIM") for young stocks, organized in the 1990s with the
goal of assisting small startup companies. 162 London's AIM is subject to
much less government oversight of firm operations, accounting and
disclosure than the London Stock Exchange or America's main markets,
63
but this has not stopped the exchange from rapid growth. London's
AIM foreign listings, not all of which are IPOs, "have skyrocketed to
306 from 31 in 2 0 0 0 .'' 64 In fact, fifty American firms have listed on
of other
AIM and most have done so since 2004, and hundreds
65
so.1
doing
considering
are
American firms have said they
AIM's success is viewed as evidence that smaller companies have
been seeking a haven from U.S. securities rules. 166 For example,
Protonex Technology Company, a Massachusetts maker of fuel-cell
power systems, went public on London's AIM in 2006. Scott Pearson,
Protonex's CEO, noted "it would have cost three times as much to list in
the U.S., in large part due to legal and auditing costs related to SarbanesOxley. 1 67 Many of London's AIM companies probably could not have
listed on a U.S. exchange even before Sarbanes-Oxley, either because
too small to be considered by U.S.
they did not qualify or were
168
investors.
and
underwriters
Seemingly, the closed doors of many underwriters and investors to
smaller companies, combined with increased regulatory costs, may be a
driving force behind the movement of small companies from domestic
exchanges to international ones. And while the revenues generated from
these smaller companies in isolation may not seem to have a large
impact on the market, the proceeds that American exchanges are losing

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
Id.
7
ipetal.,supranote 12, atAl .
Id.
Id.
Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70.
Ipetal., supra note 12, at A17.
Id.
Id.
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out of the
to foreign exchanges from these smaller companies are left
169
equation of the theory of American capital market decline.
Smaller companies have also experienced a decline in coverage of
their stock since banks have been forced by former New York Attorney
General (now Governor) Elliot Spitzer to tighten up their research
procedures in light of recent scandals. 70 The center of the scandals was
the discovery of five prominent Wall Street investment banks that
illegally compensated competitors to publish client research without
disclosing such arrangements.' 7' The SEC's complaints against the firms
were settled for $1.4 billion.1 72 While the goal of the SEC's aggressive
penalties was to set a precedent where research is separated from
banking in order to make the information more transparent, the effects
difficulty in getting
on small business are likely to include increased
173
analyst coverage and access to capital markets.
The theories advanced for the decline in domestic IPO performance
and the simultaneous increase in the global share of IPOs tell only half
the story. The reliance on overly strict regulation and the place it
occupies at the forefront of the list of theories as to decreased American
competitiveness is misleading. The regulatory system alone is not the
driving force behind the decline in American investment and IPOs.
There is no doubt that Sarbanes-Oxley has room for improvement, but it
is not "a harbinger of doom for America's capital markets," and we
should be wary of any reports that support this view. 174 Considerations
regarding Sarbanes-Oxley regulations and costs "in the decision of many
companies to go private have probably been overstated,"'' 75 and while
the U.S. regulatory burden has risen, the same is true of most countries
which have become America's most daunting competitors. 176 Further,
the implications that flow from observing the decline in IPOs post
Sarbanes-Oxley in isolation from the performance of the economy as a
whole and from other prevalent factors driving U.S. investment abroad
are that the U.S. economic position is viewed in an overly pessimistic
manner. While it is true that the American markets need to take action to
169. Id.
170.
171.

Down on the Street, supra note 90, at 70.
Matt Krantz, SEC: Investment Banks Paid Rivals for Research, USA TODAY, Apr. 28,

2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/2003-04-28-fees_x.htm.
172. Id.
173. Thor Valdmanis, Few Believe $1.4B Deal Will Change Wall St., USA TODAY, Apr. 29,
2003, at B 1.
174. Surowiecki, supra note 92, at 29.
175. lp et al., supra note 12, at A17 (internal quotations omitted).
176. Id.
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ensure that they remain competitive in an ever-changing and rapidly
growing global market place, it does not logically follow that increases
in IPOs alone will ensure this.
American securities markets need a new strategy. Regardless of
whether the American markets are in decline or are performing at par,
the conversation surrounding IPOs needs to change from one of
significant financial indicator to simply a factor in the equation of capital
market performance. The plausibility of gaining a competitive edge by
increasing the number of IPOs undertaken in the U.S. is marginal at best.
Moreover, the notion that the naked tally of IPOs reveals a robust market
is flawed. IPOs are extremely costly and are often only best suited for
those companies that already have the financial means to fund the
offering. Perhaps, if we look in the one place that is often the most
overlooked, small capital company performance and methods of gaining
public access, we may find "diamonds."
IV.

THE IPO INDICATOR: A MEASURE OF ECONOMIC HEALTH WITH
.

A.

UNDUE RELIANCE

MisplacedReliance on the Dwindling Numbers ofDomestic IPOs as
Conclusive Evidence of a Downward Spiral in American
Competitiveness

To state that IPOs are conclusively declining and effecting a death
trap for American market stamina would subject the speaker of such
statement to a Section 11 or 12 liability equivalent for misleading
speech, if there were one. 177 And even if the numbers of domestic IPOs
are moving downward, IPOs are not, in isolation, a conclusive measure
of economic well being. 178 The year 2006 marked "the richest year in
Wall Street history. 1 79 The top five U.S. financial firms, all based in8 °
New York, reported more than $60 billion in net income last year.
Furthermore, there is little evidence that foreign countries are shying

177. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(2000); 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2000).
178. Deepak Gopinath, IPOs Shun U.S. Exchanges While Wall Street Collects Record Fees,
=
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer
home&sid=aFO7N_Ngeuzc (noting that Rob Nichols, President of the Financial Services Forum,
stated: "IPO data doesn't tell the whole story. It would be disingenuous to link IPOs to SarbanesOxley exclusively.").
179. Id.

180. Id.
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but
away from American IPOs, rather foreign markets are improving,
81
declining.'
are
markets
U.S.
that
mean
turn
in
not
this does
Even if one were to concede that the U.S. has seen a decline in IPO
percentages, the small number of IPOs suggests that maybe they should
not be regarded as having the ultimate impact on the performance of our
markets. The volume of IPOs is trivial as compared to other classes of
trading transactions.1 82 In 2006, there were only seven "mega IPOs" in
America. 83 Those who reaped the benefits of these IPOs were the
issuers, underwriters and investors involved in the process. Regardless
of how we categorize the impact of IPOs on American markets, the
larger issue seems to be the blame the so-called decline in IPOs has
induced. The many fingers pointing to regulatory burden are viewing the
situation as a still picture, rather than properly as a collage. While it is
purported that Sarbanes-Oxley is fueling an American market decline, a
look at some of the statistics suggest there is evidence to the contrary.
The post Sarbanes-Oxley period in America has enjoyed an inflow of
foreign market participants as evidenced by "the thirty-four foreign IPOs
in 2006 equaled the total in 2005 and represented the highest level since
SOX was enacted." 184 And while much of the debate focuses on Section
404 of Sarbanes-Oxley, there is evidence that the spike in accounting
fees for larger public companies was not a direct result from compliance
with this provision. 85 Non-accelerated filers, companies not yet
mandated to satisfy Section 404, also had auditing costs increase fortytwo percent. 86 Further, class actions and the almost unattainable costs of
IPOs have been chilling the market for these offerings for years. The
equation cannot be said to be complete without an analysis of how class
actions and investment bank interests have pushed the pendulum in
American markets.

181.

Campos, supra note 132.

182. COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 138.
183. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
184. Campos, supra note 132.
185.

David M. Katz, Post-404, Fees Spiked 66 Percent: Study, CFO.cOM, Feb. 15, 2007,

http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2007/20070215_HeadlinelO258 1-Katz.html (explaining
that "[b]etween 2003 and 2005, the first three years in which many companies had to comply with
Sarbanes-Oxley's internal control provision, they saw their audit and audit-related fees soar by 66
percent" but the research indicates "that there are a number of reasons audit fees have increased that
have nothing to do with Section 404").
186. See id. (quoting "a study of thousands of corporate annual reports" and reporting that
"companies required to comply with [Section] 404 saw their audit and audit-related fees increase
from a total of $5.1 billion in the first pre-compliance year to $8.5 billion in their second year of
compliance . . . [and] total fees that non-accelerated filers shouldered rose from $1.8 billion to $2.1
billion.").
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A Challenge to Convention: Alternative Explanationsfor Increased
Global Market CompetitionRelative to U.S. Markets

"Investor protection is a cornerstone of all strong and successful
capital markets and is the hallmark of the U.S. capital markets."1 87 In
light of this statement by the Chamber of Commerce it is thus ironic that
the headlines of 2006 and 2007 have called for a regulatory retreat,
which could in turn reduce protections for investors and decrease
scrutiny of financial firms. 188 In his speech in London on March 8, 2007,
SEC Commissioner Roel C. Campos expressed concern over the
applause the idea of "light touch" standards as a means of promoting
markets has received. 189 Promoting lower standards of regulation means
less protection and not only does this contradict the goals of securities
law, it also proves less appealing to investors seeking to list their shares
with a sense of security.
It is reported that significant non-U.S. investors intend to continue
to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in domestic markets because
they "love the protections rendered by Sarbanes-Oxley."' 90 And if
Sarbanes-Oxley is driving investors away from U.S. markets, then why
is it that the standards demanded by the act are being emulated on a
global level? 19 1 To thus say that Rule 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley is to be
blamed for the alleged loss in U.S. competitiveness is to grossly
oversimplify the problem. Many of the investors that are claimed to be
fleeing the American markets are actually doing just the contrary, and in
large part the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley are keeping these investors
put. This Note now turns to sources other than Sarbanes-Oxley whose
influences on the market have been well-documented: class actions and
underwriter compensation.
1. The Class Action Conundrum
One of most unique aspects of the U.S. capital markets is the broad
availability for individuals to recover damages for a wide array of
violations of U.S. securities laws through private lawsuits. While many
countries authorize private parties to institute lawsuits to recover

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 103, at 28.
Campos, supra note 132.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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damages pertaining to capital market activities, none compare in terms
of the size and scale of claims allowed by U.S. investors.' 92 The costs of
such a system are often disproportionate to its benefits. 193 To illustrate
this point, take the number of civil penalties in the U.S. as compared to
one of its market competitors, the United Kingdom Civil penalties
amounted to $4.74 billion in the U.S. during 2004, an amount which
easily trumps the $40.48 million in penalties imposed in the United
Kingdom. 94 The hardest hit fell on issuers in the U.S. who incurred $3.5
billion in liability.' 95 And the trend has continued. Securities class action
settlements reached a record high of more than $18 billion in 2006.196
Oftentimes, class actions are simply settled to avoid the expense of
litigation and the burden on management's time even when management
has done nothing wrong. 197 The system
has for years been touted as
98
costly, arbitrary and unpredictable. 1
While there is some evidence that the amount of securities class
action filings have dropped, specifically noting the thirty-eight percent
drop in 2006, there is warning that this trend is not permanent as
whatever has prompted the decrease may not be built into the system. 199
Whether or not the decline represents what will happen in 2007, the
impact of securities class actions as a deterrent to American market
entrance is well documented. 20 0 Exposure to class action lawsuits,

192. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 103, at 29 (noting that few European
nations have "group actions" comparable to U.S. class actions).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Press Release, Institutional Shareholder Services, Institutional Shareholder Services
Ranks Top 50 Plaintiffs' Law Firms for 2006 (Mar. 6, 2007) (on file with author) (noting
additionally that the "trend appears to be driven by more institutional investors participating in the
securities litigation process ...[and] serving as lead plaintiffs in U.S. class action cases").
197. A 'Shadow' Critique of Competitiveness, Futures, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Feb. 26, 2007,
http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2007/20070226_Headline 102625_Writer.html (offering
as evidence that U.S. class action lawsuits produce more benefits than burdens the fact that "[tlhe
rate for directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance is six times higher in the United States than
in Europe").
198. See, e.g., J. Scott Colesanti, The Private SecuritiesLitigation Reform Act of 1995: Did the
"RushedDebate" Really Spell the End of Securities Claims and RICO?, 26 SEC. REG. L.J. 139, 13941 (1998) (stating the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was inspired by the abuses
of the class action process, that the Act has not reduced lawsuits and arguing that "perhaps the Act's
proper focus should have been the fact that accountants, brokerage houses, and corporate directors
were being joined in lawsuits, regardless of the case's disposition").
199. Pamela A. MacLean, Class Action Decline in '06 May Not Be a Trend, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8,
2007,
at
6,
available
at
http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2007/20070108Headline 102326_MacLean.html.
200. See supra notes 192-93, 196 and accompanying text.
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specifically claims under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act and
Rule 1Ob-5 of the Exchange Act, have been a cost that foreign
companies have been unwilling to bear in exchange for a U.S. listing.
2. The Influence of the Affluent: Investment Banks and the
Overseas Push
The attack on the strict regulations in the U.S. has been voiced the
loudest by those who seek to benefit from regulatory removal. 20 1 IPOs
are in essence bought by those who can afford their undertaking.
Further, underwriters who are key players in the IPO process saw their
best year in terms of profits in 2006.202 How then can we say IPOs are
such a trustworthy economic indicator?
While arguments that the U.S. is losing its competitive edge
become more and more prevalent, investment banking firms are by no
means accompanying the U.S. market downstream. Between "onequarter and one-third of the revenue stream for large global securities
firms now flows from foreign markets. 20 3 Even the smaller investment
firms have access to foreign capital markets.20 4 The result, Wall Street
firms win no matter where the deals are made.20 5 For example, Merrill
Lynch played a role in the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China IPO,
which yielded $401 million in fees.206 Additionally, according to
Bloomberg, "[i]nvestment banks earned $41.7 billion in fees
underwriting securities and advising on mergers in Europe and Asia last
year, almost 40 percent more than the $29.9 billion" generated in the
2 07
U.S.
So while the investment banks have been at the forefront of the
201.

See, e.g., Blair Nicholas & Niki Mendoza, The "Committee on Capital Markets

Regulation"... A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ADVOCATE, Third Quarter

2006, at 3 (arguing there is reason to challenge the independence of the independent, bipartisan
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation who put out the Chamber of Commerce report, as the
committee is heavy on CEO and other executive and directors of investment management
companies and accounting firms, a lobbyist for major banks, investment banks and insurers, and
does not include any former or current members of the SEC, nor does it include any institutional
investors or members of the securities litigation plaintiffs' bar).
202. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
203. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 103, at 23 (stating "[o]ne industry leader
has noted that the goals for his institution were to target a balance of securities sales at 60%
international and 40% domestic within the next three years").
204. Id.
205. Gopinath, supra note 178 (furthering this point by adding that "[t]he likes of Citigroup
and Goldman Sachs profit from underwriting stocks the world over. Although none of the 10
biggest stock offerings of 2006 were done in New York, New York-based firms played a role in all
of them, sharing the $1.7 billion in fees those sales generated.").
206. Id.
207. Id.
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argument that the U.S. is losing its standing as a leader in the global
marketplace, and have advocated for a relaxation of the securities laws
in order to protect jobs, the banks themselves have contributed to the
problem. Investment banks have facilitated in pricing the U.S. out of the
global IPO market by charging more in the U.S. to underwrite stocks
than anywhere else in the world.20 8 The seven percent standard
commission of underwriting an IPO is a far cry from the fixed
commissions that used to be common practice in the U.S. 20 9 And when

the SEC abolished fixed commissions in 1975, the common sentiment
was that which it is today, that Wall Street was doomed.2 10
In the face of increased costs of IPOs, it would only make sense
that companies will seek to find where the lowest underwriter fees are
charged. This is clearly not the U.S. If Wall Street is true to their word
about keeping U.S. markets competitive, perhaps the best place to start
would be to lower rates at home. However, this is by no means the sole
solution to the problem. Perhaps only a baby step, for even with lower
costs, smaller companies will likely find that the doors to IPO access
remain closed. It is here, with an eye on the small-cap "diamonds," that
American markets need to explore new ways to ensure access to public
markets as many of our foreign counterparts, such as the London Stock
Exchange, have already done.2 1'
V. THE DIAMOND IN THE ROUGH THEORY AS A PROPOSAL FOR
BOOSTING AMERICA'S COMPETITIVE POSITION: FOLLOWING THE
SMALL BUSINESS ISSUER LEAD

"Small business drives much of the economic activity, innovation
and job creation" domestically. 1 2 However, the cost of capital for small
business, especially in the U.S., often stunts their development, growth
and capital formation.2 13 Businesses too small to enter the public market
have fewer options to raise the capital they need to expand and become
new players in the public markets.214 Despite the fact that IPOs are often
208. Id.(noting that "[i]n the U.S., investment banks charged fees averaging 4.4 percent of the
value of stock sales in 2006" and an average of 2.3 percent in Europe).
209. Id.

210. Id.
211.
212.

See supra Part III.C.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 103, at 27 (noting that "small businesses

have generated 60% to 80% of net jobs annually over the last decade... [and] made up 97% of
exporters and produced 28.6% of the known export value in FY 2005").
213. Id.
214. Id.
("Likewise,
indirect
cost
increases
disproportionately
affect
smaller
firms .... [D]irector fees for small public firms increased approximately 61% from 1998 to 2004,
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unattainable for small-cap companies, small-caps are entering the public
market with increasing numbers by employing non-traditional methods
of going public such as Regulation A and reverse mergers. As compared
to the seven "mega IPOs" of 2006, there were thirty-five Regulation A
filings from November 2005 to June 2007 and 179 reverse merger
transactions in 2005.215 Reverse mergers totaled $1.31 billion in market
capitalization during the first quarter of 2006 alone. Perhaps it is time we
pay more attention to these small-cap issuers in an effort to raise U.S.
competitiveness.
A. Alternative Methods to the IPO: Regulation A and Reverse Mergers
1. Regulation A
Regulation A is a method of bringing small-cap private companies
public using a shorter form of filing than the registration statements used
in an IPO. 216 The form provides a hybrid process by which small
companies may make a public offering of securities officially exempt
from registration under the Securities Act but still subject to SEC
review. 217 Regulation A applies to offerings to an unlimited number of
investors, whether accredited or non-accredited, and offerings pursuant
to the exemption are currently capped at $5 million during any twelve
month period.218 The regulation further requires the issuer to complete
amounting to $3.19 per $1,000 of sales. For large firms, the director fees rose to $0.32 per $1,000 in
net sales.").
215. Hoovers, Inc., Hoovers IPO Scorecard, http://www.hoovers.com/business-information/pageid..15824-/global-corp-press-index.xhtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2007); SECFilings.com,
Form 1-A, http://www.secfilings.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2007); FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 2.
216. Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2006); see supranote 17 and accompanying text.
217. Wayne Simon, Recent Developments Concerning Small Company CapitalFormation, 27
BEVERLY HILLS BAR J. 74, 75 (1993).
218. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251; Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (defining accredited investor
as "any person who comes within any of the following categories, or who the issuer reasonably
believes comes within any of the following categories, at the time of the sale of securities to that
person" any bank or "any savings and loan association or other institution... whether acting in its
individual or fiduciary capacity; any broker or dealer registered pursuant to section 15 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; any insurance company.., any investment company [subject to
certain limitations];" any employee benefit plans as defined in the section; private business
development company as defined in the section; "[a]ny director, executive officer, or general
partner of the issuer of securities being offered or sold or any director, executive officer or general
partner of a general partner of that issuer;" "[a]ny natural person whose individual net worth, or
joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000;" "[a]ny
natural person who has an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent
years or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has
a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year;" "[a]ny trust, with
total assets in excess of $5,000,000, not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities
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and file a Form 1-A with the SEC, known as the offering statement, at
least ten days before the offering is to commence. 2' 9 The offering
statement is the Regulation A equivalent of a registration statement and
asks the issuer to provide much of the same information including risk
factors, plan of distribution, pending litigation, tax aspects, officers and
key personnel. Regulation A provides for investor protection by
requiring, unlike other exemptions, that a mandatory disclosure
document, known as the offering circular, be placed in the investor's
hand. 220 This affords many of the same investor protections as Form S-I
(the form most commonly used in IPOs) as the offering circular
requirement closely resembles the traditional prospectus and mandates
that detailed company information and descriptions of the potential and
current risks of investing in the company be provided to investors.
Offering circulars, like the prospectus, must also be distributed by the
issuer and/or broker-dealers to prospective and actual purchasers of the
issuer's stock.221
Form 1-A is a shortened registration form designed to make the
costs involvedin its preparation less burdensome. Unlike an IPO, once
the Form 1-A offering statement has been filed, oral offers may be made,
written offers may be made under Securities Act Rule 255, printed
advertisements may be published and radio or television broadcasts may
be made provided that:
[T]hey state from whom a Preliminary Offering Circular or Final
Offering Circular may be obtained, and contain no more than the
following information: (1) The name of the issuer of the security; (2)
The title of the security, the amount being offered and the per unit
offering price to the public; (3) The general type of the issuer's

offered;" and "any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited investors."); see also
Simon, supra note 217, at 75 ("Formerly, Regulation A allowed the sale of only $1,500,000 by or
on behalf of the issuer in any one year, including no more than $100,000 to $500,000 by or on
behalf of anyone other than the issuer or its affiliates.").
There is a proposal pending for two new rules, Rules 509 and 216, to define a new
category of accredited investor called an accredited natural person, which would include "any
natural person who... owns as least $2.5 million in investments." Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers
to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment
Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 8766 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,736 at 84,041 (proposed
Dec. 27, 2006). For a further analysis of the proposed rules see generally id.
219. Simon, supra note 217, at 76; 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1) (which provides "[e]xcept as
allowed by § 230.254, no offer of securities shall be made unless a Form I-A offering statement has
been filed with the Commission").
220. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2).
221. Id. § 230.25 1(d)(2)(ii).
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business; and (4) A brief statement as to the general character and
location of its property.222
However, securities may not be sold until the SEC qualifies (the
equivalent of IPO effectiveness) the Form 1-A offering statement and
the investor has received both the preliminary and final offering
circulars.

223

The benefits of a Regulation A offering are numerous. The offering
circular is more streamlined than a full registration statement and does
not require audited financial statements.224 This greatly reduces costs as
the fees associated with accountants, lawyers and underwriters make up
the true expense of an IPO. 225 There is no limitation on the number of
purchasers under a Regulation A offering and additionally, the securities
226
This is a huge
offered are not restricted and can be freely resold.
advantage as oftentimes potential purchasers may be warded off when
they hear the sale involves restricted securities, as the liquidity of such
stock is lesser. Stock issued under the regulation can be traded on public
markets, but the company is required to file a Form 10-SB with audited
financials before it is deemed a full reporting company and the stock can
only trade on the Pink Sheets until then.227
Regulation A is also unique in that it allows an issuer to "test-thewaters"-to evaluate demand for the issuer's stock even before an
offering is effected. 8 This provision is found in Securities Act Rule
254, which "allows companies contemplating a Regulation A offering to
solicit indications of interest from potential investors without first
preparing a formal offering statement. ' ,229 In theory, if sufficient number
222. Id. § 230.251(d)(1)(ii)(C). Further, "[a]fter the Form 1-A offering statement has been
qualified, other written offers may be made, but only if accompanied with or preceded by a Final
Offering Circular." Id. § 230.25 l(d)(l)(iii). Securities Act Rule 255 provides, among other things,
that "prior to qualification of the required offering statement but after its filing, a written offer of
securities may be made if... [t]he outside front cover page of the material bears the caption
'Preliminary Offering Circular,' the date of issuance, and the following statement.., in boldface
type 'An offering statement pursuant to Regulation A relating to these securities has been filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission."' Id. § 230.255(a). For a complete list of qualifications of
written statements see Securities Act Rule 255. Id.
223. Id. § 230.251(d)(2).
224.

FELDMAN, Supra note 17, at 171.

225. Lisa A. Mondschein, Note, The Solicitation and Marketing of Securities Offerings
Through the Internet,65 BROOK. L. REV. 185, 193-96 (1999).
226. Id.
227. FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 171.
228. Mondschein, supra note 225, at 194 (further noting that the testing the waters concept was
introduced in 1992 pursuant to the Small Business Initiatives Release).
229. Simon, supra note 217, at 76. Rule 254, also known as the "testing the waters" provision
provides that:
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of investors do not express interest, the company can learn that fact
without incurring the expenditures to qualify the Form 1-A and prepare
the preliminary and final offering circulars. On the other hand, if
investors do express sufficient interest, the issuer will then proceed with
full-scale compliance with Regulation A before actually engaging in the
offering but will have the safety of knowing there will be demand for
their shares once the offering is effected.23 °
Regulation A is not without restriction. Under Rule 251, there must
be a six month dividing line between an issuer's offerings under the
provision to ensure that they will not be integrated.2 3' If an issuer does
not follow this, there is a danger that it will exceed the $5 million cap on
Regulation A offerings and be violative of Section 5 of the Securities
Act. Further, if a company has already undertaken a public offering
under Form S-1, they are not permitted to use the exemption. 232 In
practice this makes sense. Most issuers who will avail themselves of
Regulation A do not have the money to fund a Form S-1 offering, and
Regulation A is meant to benefit the small players in the market.
Furthermore, the restriction that investment companies such as mutual
funds may not use the exemption makes sense for the same reasons.
Finally, the $5 million cap on offerings is in gross, not net, and can be a
rather small amount of capital when the fees for undertaking the offer
are taken into account. But regarding the amount as small or large really
depends on the size of the issuer.
The lesser expense, the ability to test the waters and the usual lack
of underwriter involvement inherent in Regulation A, in contrast to
IPOs, have attracted small issuers for years and was enacted for this
purpose. 23 The benefits of the provision should be further explored in
talks about U.S. competitiveness. While "the SEC has proposed to
extend the scope of the testing-the-waters rule to registered IPOs, ' ' 234 it
remains a wonder that this has not occupied a place in the debate over
An issuer may publish or deliver to prospective purchasers a written document or make
scripted radio or television broadcasts to determine whether there is any interest in a
contemplated securities offering. Following submission of the written document or script
of the broadcast to the Commission ...oral communications with prospective investors
and other broadcasts are permitted. The written documents, broadcasts and oral
communications are each subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws.... No sale may be made until qualification of the offering statement.
17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) to (b) (2006).
230. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (2006).
231. Id. § 230.251(c).
232. Id.
233. Mondschein, supra note 225, at 194.
234. Id. at 195.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

37

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 35:1865

U.S. competitiveness. Such a proposal could allow foreign issuers and
smaller issuers, skeptical of the costs of the IPO process, to evaluate the
prospects of profit before enduring the expense. Further, rather than
entering into an IPO with a significant risk of loss, the process could
allow companies to get a "sneak-preview" of the benefits of going public
and allow a more concrete risk benefit analysis.
Aiother proposal excluded from the debate is the SEC's
contemplation of raising the $5 million cap on Regulation A to $20
million, which began in 2003.235 Imagine the growth potential this could
have on smaller companies, both foreign and domestic. Companies like
Mastercard, which raised $2.6 billion in one of the "mega IPOs" of
2006, may be found in the small companies that are often left out of the
equation on improving the U.S. competitive position. If we can remove
these companies from the "rough" of restraints that are placed upon
them when seeking public market access, is it not possible they may be
the "diamonds" the U.S. market is looking for to raise competitiveness?
2. Reverse Mergers
A reverse merger is a transaction by which a private operating
corporation or private company completes a business combination with a
shell corporation whose stock has previously been offered to the public,
or has otherwise become subject to the reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act.236 The shell corporation typically was either formed with
no business operations to function as a shell company or is the dormant
23 7 The
remnants of a now sold or defunct business that is still public.
private company's shareholders generally receive between 65 and 95
percent of the stock of the public shell. Securities Act Rule 405 and
Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 define shell company as: "a registrant, other
than an asset-backed issuer ...that has: (1) No or nominal operations;
and (2) Either: (i) No or nominal assets; (ii) Assets consisting solely of
cash and cash equivalents; or (iii) Assets consisting238of any amount of
cash and cash equivalents and nominal other assets.,
The prevalence of reverse mergers in both U.S. and foreign markets
has increased in the past five years beginning with the dot-coin "bust" in

235. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: 2003
4 (2003), available at
SECURITIES REGULATION
CONFERENCE ON FEDERAL-STATE
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/ffedst2003.htm.
236. See, e.g., SEC v. M & A West, Inc., No. C-01-3378, 2005 WL 1514101, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
June 20, 2005); FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 20.
237. FELDMAN, supranote 17, at 20.

238.

17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2006); 17 C.F.R § 240.12b-2 (2006).
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2000 which significantly halted the IPO market. 239 In 2000 there were 46
reverse merger transactions and by 2004 this number jumped to 168.240
There were 179 reverse merger transactions closed in 2005.241 While
reverse mergers are commonly utilized by smaller, unknown companies,
a few reverse merger transactions have caught the public eye. One of the
most high-profile reverse mergers was the NYSE merger into
Archipelago Holdings in a deal worth $9 billion.2 42 In 1970, Ted
Turner's combination with once publicly traded Rice Broadcasting
evolved into the entity now known as Turner Broadcasting Systems.243
America West Holding Corporation's (parent of America West Airlines)
merger with US Airways Group (parent of US Airways) in September
2005 was also completed using the reverse merger technique. 24 But
even the less publicized deals have enjoyed great success. In February
2005, an investor group raised "$46.5 million contemporaneous with the
acquisition of a public shell company called Sports Entertainment
Enterprises, Inc." and an "85 percent interest in Elvis Presley's name,
image and likeness" as well as the operations of Elvis's Graceland
home.2 45 The company, CKX, Inc., has continued its pattern of success
as evidenced by its acquisition of the proprietary rights to American
Idol.246

So what exactly is the appeal of a reverse merger? The answer is
simple-going public through a reverse merger allows a private
company to go public typically at a lesser cost, in a smaller time frame

239. See, e.g., Chris O'Brien, It Turned on a Dime... Or $2 Trillion Technology Investors,
Badly Burned, Remain Wary, MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 10, 2005, at Al (explaining that the Dot Com
Bust began on March 10, 2000, when the "Nasdaq composite index, bellwether of the tech

economy, peaked at 5,048.62 ...[and] [iun the following weeks, shareholders began dumping tech
stocks and didn't stop for two years." Investors lost trillions of dollars and began suing insiders who
cashed out billions. The era was also marked by numerous accounting scandals and newer

companies finding it very "difficult to raise money from cautions stock market investors.");
FELDMAN, supranote 17, at 2 ("The numbers of closed reverse mergers has increased fourfold since
2000." In 2000, 46 reverse merger transactions successfully closed and by 2005 this number

increased to 179.).
240.
241.
242.

FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 2.
Id.
Andrew Dolbeck, Alternative Offerings: Going Public with Reverse Mergers & SPACs,

WKLY. CORP. GROWTH REP., May 22, 2006, at 1.
243. Turner Hughes Corp., Reverse Mergers, http://www.turnerhughescorp.com/reversemergers.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
244. Tom Van Riper, US Airways Seen With 'Low-Hanging Fruit' to Pick, FORBES.COM, Oct.

10, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/markets/equities/2005/10/10/us-airways-energy-1010markets09.
html.
245.

FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 2.

246.

Id.
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and with less stock dilution than through an IPO.2 4 7 In a recent study
comparing IPOs and reverse mergers as alternative methods of going
public, it was found that reverse merger deals were completed with248a
sample.
mean duration of "92 days compared to 287 days for the IPO
It is not surprising, in light of the increased costs and decreased access to
IPOs, that private firms choosing the reverse merger path were
significantly smaller with a median value for total assets of $2.19
million, as compared to a median value of $41.72 million for companies
opting to go public through an lPO. 24 9 The study also reported that
companies undergoing reverse mergers exhibited "higher asset growth
rates and are closer to their inception date" than companies utilizing
IPOs. 250 It is also noted that insiders in reverse mergers forfeit a smaller
ownership percentage and this may further suggest that such owners
have no intention to "cash out" when the company goes public. 251 Lastly,
the "underpricing of the stock, calculated as the return on the first
appears to be significantly lower for the reverse merger
trading25day,
2
deals.
While this study greatly supports the current exploration of reverse
mergers by smaller companies looking to gain access to public markets
where obstacles such as the high prices of IPOs have prevented such
access, the method is not without its critics. It has been argued that
"[w]hile shell corporations may appear to be an attractive alternative to a
registered public offering, the true cost of merging with a shell
corporation is usually significantly greater than a conventional initial
public offering., 253 The significant problems in going public by merging
with, or transferring assets to, a public shell corporation include the high
cost of due diligence, the problem of obtaining free-trading stock and

247. Id. at 23-24 (noting "reverse mergers can be completed for under $1 million" while IPOs
cost several million to complete and can be completed in about three to four months, while IPOs
take a minimum of nine months to complete).
248. loannis V. Floros & Kuldeep Shastri, A Study of Reverse Mergers: Questionable
Shortcuts to the Public Markets or Viable Solutions?, THE REVERSE MERGER REP., at 32 (2006)

(The study "analyzed a sample of 181 firms using reverse mergers and a matched sample of firms
using IPOs over the time period starting in 1991 and ending in 2004 in order to understand why
companies chose the reverse merger path to become public.").
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. (noting "[s]pecifically, the median decrease in percentage insider ownership is 19.10%
for the reverse merger sample while that for the IPO sample is 22.46%").
252. Id.
253. Mark T. Hiraide, Appendix 10-B: The "'Shell Game": Dangers of Merging with Public
Shell Companies, in REPRESENTING START-UP COMPANIES 10-31, 10-31 (2006) (emphasis added).
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SEC scrutiny.2 54 Specifically, critics correctly argue that one of the more
difficult tasks is evaluating the "cleanliness" of the shell company as it is
often difficult to tell whether the shares held by the public are actually
held by bona fide stockholders or nominees controlled by the promoters
of the shell.255 If the latter is true, the market price of the shares can be
easily manipulated and the stock price following a merger can thus be
artificially inflated.256
Critics also cite the transferability of stock as a reason to avoid the
reverse merger technique. In a reverse merger transaction "shell
promoters often attempt to transfer unrestricted stock to the new owners
and their affiliates., 257 The NASD and the SEC have often viewed
promoters of shells and their transferees as underwriters of the shares
that are issued. 258 What this means is that re-sales of certain stock issued
in reverse merger transactions are prohibited under Rule 144 of the
Securities Act, as underwriters are explicitly exempt from availing
themselves of Rule 144.259
Finally, if reverse mergers provide smaller companies with less
costly access to public markets as compared to IPOs, why is it that the
words "reverse merger" produce hesitancy in the minds of even the most
savvy of businesspeople and lawyers? The 1970s and 1980s were
marked by a general lack of regulation of both reverse mergers and the
use of shell companies, and thus reverse mergers became easy grounds
for fraudulent activity. 260 A number of schemes were initiated using shell
companies whereby new public shells would be formed for the sole
purpose of raising money from public investors and removing that
money in the form of fees, salaries and other "benefits" for running the
shell.2 6' Such practices tainted the reverse merger name and most
investors looked away from any company intending to engage in a
262
reverse merger transaction.
In 2005, likely in response to the rising numbers of reverse merger
transactions, the SEC promulgated rules aimed to protect investors by
deterring fraud and abuse in the use of reporting shell companies in

254.
255.

Id. at 10-31 to 10-32.
Id. at 10-31.

256. Id.
257. Id. at 10-31 to 10-32.
258. Id. at 10-32.
259. Id.; Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006).
260. FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 2 1.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 22.
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transactions such as reverse mergers. 26 Among the changes the SEC
implemented were: (1) the prohibition of the use of Form S-8 by shell
companies; (2) the increased disclosure necessary to register securities
pursuant to a stock option or employee benefit plan; and (3) the
requirement that in a transaction where a shell company ceases to be a
shell company, the surviving entity must disclose the information that
would be required under a Form 10 or Form 10-SB (for small
businesses) in a Form 8-K.264 For a reverse merger transaction, this Form
8-K filing must take place within four days following the completion of
the reverse merger as opposed to the seventy-one days companies were
given prior to these rules to file a Form 8-K with audited financial
2 65 The purpose
statements following a reverse merger transaction.
behind the four day limitation is to ensure that shell companies provide
investors with adequate information to make informed investment
decisions. Further, it was believed by the SEC that obtaining audited
financial statements would deter abuse and further the goals of
protecting investors.266

263. Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234
(July 21, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 240, 249).
The rules and rule amendments we are adopting today do not address the relative merits
of shell companies. We recognize that companies and their professional advisors often
use shell companies for many legitimate corporate structuring purposes. Similarly, our
definition and use of the term 'shell company' is not intended to imply that shell
companies are inherently fraudulent. Rather, these rules target regulatory problems that
we have identified where shell companies have been used as vehicles to commit fraud
and abuse our regulatory processes.
Id.
264. Id. at 42,238; FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 134-35 (The disclosures that must be made
under the Form 8-K following a transaction where a shell company ceases to be such include "all
the information that would be in a prospectus for a traditional IPO: two years of audited financial
information. . . full business description, risk factors, affiliate (related party) transactions, executive
compensation, comparative period-to-period analysis of financial results, description of capital
charter, bylaws....
stock, discussions of securities offerings... material contracts...,
biographical information . . . on all officers and directors and their ownership information as well as
5 percent shareholders."). Form S-8 is a registration statement that may be used by companies
subject to the requirement to file reports pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and is
not a shell company and has not been a shell company for at least sixty calendar days and if it has
been a shell company has filed current Form 10 information with the Commission at least sixty days
before reflecting its status as an entity that is not a shell company. 17 C.F.R § 239.16b (2006). For
further qualifications of use of Form S-8 registration statements see General Instruction A. See
United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Form S-8, General Instruction (A), availableat
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-8.pdf.
265. See United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 8-K, General Instruction
(B)(l), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf; Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and
Godsends? A Critique of "Reverse Merger" Policy, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 475, 504-05 (2006).
266. Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. at 42,239.
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In an attempt to remove the opportunity for abusive schemes, the new
rules forbid the use of Form S-8 by shell companies. The prohibition
continues for any former shell company until sixty calendar days after
it files, upon completion of a transaction in which it ceases to be a shell
company, information equivalent to that required by Form 10 or Form
10-SB in connection with the registration of a class of securities. The
SEC holds the view that the sixty-day period will afford employees
to absorb all relevant information in the
and the market the opportunity
267
company's disclosures.
And it seems to have worked. The increased use of reverse merger

transactions by both domestic and foreign small-cap companies seems to
suggest a revitalized view of the benefits of the method. Specifically,
Chinese companies and German biotechnology companies have been
availing themselves of the technique to go public in the U.S. with
increasing numbers.2 68 For example, in May 2006, a private German
biotech company engaged in a reverse merger with, and was taken over
by, publicly held U.S. biotech company CancerVax, creating a
transatlantic company that listed on NASDAQ under the name
Micromet.269 Chinese companies further regard reverse mergers as
preferable to a traditional IPO since it allows the company a more
predictable foray into U.S. public markets. In August 2006 alone,
generally a calm month for trading activity, Chinese companies
completed eleven reverse mergers in the U.S. and five more were
announced.27 °

267. Pavkov, supra note 265, at 506.
In 1999 the SEC released a rule proposal that sought to curb a fraudulent scheme
perpetrated by shell companies: the issuance of securities to 'employees,' who were
actually only advisers or consultants to the company on Form S-8. Although ultimately
never adopted by the SEC, the rule would have prohibited the use of Form S-8 by shell
companies, which merited consideration since securities registered on Form S-8 become
effective immediately upon filing without SEC review. The argument against Form S-8
usage by shell companies was that they have no legitimate need for easy security
registration since they have no underlying business in which the employees could share
an economic interest. Not surprisingly, shell company promoters could argue that the
economic business of the company was to acquire other operating companies.
Id. at 500-01. They would thus be allowed to use Form S-8 and it explicitly excludes business
combination related shell companies from the prohibition. Id.
268. Barbara A. Jones, Business Combinations With Chinese Companies Pose Challengesfor
Due Diligence and Ongoing Reporting Obligations, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Dec. 2006, at
65; Henning Mennenoeh, Peter Kohl & Wolfgang Kircher, German Biotechs Embrace Reverse
Mergers,GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, Aug. 2006, at 14.
269. Mennenoeh et al., supra note 268, at 14.
270. Jones, supra note 268, at 65.
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Access to U.S. capital markets facilitates raising capital. While
there may still be some kinks to work out when it comes to investor
protection in reverse merger transactions, the lesson to be derived is that
perhaps small-business issuers are onto something. If American markets
make public access more widely available by exploring the reverse
merger technique and its potential to entice domestic issuers to go public
in the U.S., perhaps the so-called American competitive crisis can be
partly reduced. Beyond this, however, small capital companies may be
the key to ensuring that the U.S. markets remain afloat in an ever
expanding sea of global competition. If the Regulation A and reverse
merger techniques provide alternative means of breaking the barriers to
public access for those who cannot afford to engage in the IPO process,
it is likely that observance of and improvements to these methods will
lead America to more cost-effective ways to expand participation in its
public markets. However, until America decides to dig for "diamonds,"
these techniques will remain in the "rough" of potential instead of
reality.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although the debate on the competitive state of the U.S. remains far
from resolved, it is necessary to recognize that the reliance on IPOs as
the sole market measure of competitiveness is misleading and that
regulation alone is not driving investments from U.S. soil. The reports
on this topic are thus incomplete. IPOs must be viewed in conjunction
with other economic indicators and the impact of securities regulation
must be considered in light of other driving forces such as the
tremendous number of securities class action lawsuits and the costs of
access to public markets.
The solution to ensure America remains competitive, in light of
improved and increased investments abroad, will encompass a variety of
techniques that may very well include regulatory reform, but this is not
the only answer. Perhaps if we stray from viewing IPOs, few in number
and which benefit even fewer companies, as a measure of economic
health, we may become open to more innovative strategies to ensure an
inflow of capital to American markets from both domestic and foreign
sources. This will include focusing on small-cap companies, as many of
our foreign competitors, including the London AIM exchange, have
already begun to do. By viewing smaller companies as the potential to
be "diamonds," and studying the techniques these companies have used
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to gain access to public markets, we may very well find solutions in
places we never would have thought to look.
If the SEC follows through with its proposal to increase the cap on
Regulation A transactions from $5 million to $20 million, the number of
companies that will avail themselves of this exception will increase
exponentially from the thirty-five Regulation A offerings, which
occurred from late 2005 to 2007.271 This would represent a substantial
step in widening access to, and involvement in, U.S. public markets for
both domestic and foreign issuers, the goal which all of the reports
analyzed in this Note agree upon. Thinking out of the box should guide
the work that needs to be done. If we keep placing the blame on the
regulatory rules that protect investors, rather than exploring other
possible reasons for the decline in U.S. competitiveness, we may very
well revert back to a stage where American markets are riskier and thus
not as enticing as one would hope. With an eye on investor protection,
America should take an innovative step to ensure it remains a key player
in the global markets, and removing the small-cap "diamonds" from the
"rough," by exploring and improving the non-conventional methods of
Regulation A and reverse mergers to gain access to public markets, may
be a great place to start.
GarielNahoum *

271.
*

See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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